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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LLOYD E. LISH, JR.,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

Case no.

14111

vs.
DEAN COMPTON,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
IN SUPPORT OF DENIAL OF REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Action by a grain dealer against a producer,
farmer, for damages for breach of alleged verbal
contract.
DISPOSITION OF CASE
The lower court submitted special interrogatories
to the jury and granted judgment to the plaintiff for
$13,150.00 damages against the defendant.

On appeal

this court reversed the lov/er court holding under the
circumstances of the case that the defendant farmer was

' -2not a "merchant" under the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code and further that the confirmation of a purported
verbal contract was not received within a reasonable
time under the code and the facts of the case.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendant seeks the denial of the petition for
rehearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant for 25 years, either alone or with his
Father, has been a hay and grain farmer.

He has never

sold these commodities for anyone other than himself nor
has he sold any such commodities that were not produced
on his farm.

He does not offer the goods for sale to

the public.

Plaintiff is regularly engaged in the buy-

ing and selling of grain, either as a broker or for his
own account.
On August 2, 19 73, the plaintiff telephoned the
defendant and talked about the purchase of the latter1s
wheat crop soon to be harvested at Sublet, Idaho.

The

price discussed was $3.30 per bushel and the anticipated
harvest was about 15,000 bushels. According to the
defendant, plaintiff would see if he could get that price.
No further contact or communication between the parties
occurred until August 15th.

. :

-3According to the plaintiff, on August 3, 1973,

the plaintiff entered in his notebook written notation
of the purchase 'red wheat, rye mix.,. 15f000 bushels,
$3.30 per bushel, as is.' Such notation or confirmation
was mailed by the plaintiff to the defendant on or about
the 14th day of August 1973 and was received by the
defendant in the mails in the afternoon of August 15,
197 3.

The notation of this transaction dated August 3,

was out of sequence with other transactions in plaintiff's
notebook and had it been in its proper sequence would
have been dated August 13th or 14th.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT A
"MERCHANT" IN THIS CASE NOR WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
There is no evidence in the record whatever that
defendant was anything other than a farmer.

Defendant

never sold or bought wheat for anyone other than himself and other than the sale of his own wheat he never
dealt in grain nor by his occupation or otherwise held
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the grain trade nor has he employed an agent or broker
or intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out
as having such knowledge or skill. Plaintiff argues

in his brief that regardless of the interpretation
given by the general public to the term "merchant"
or by its interpretation by the judiciary the word
"merchant" should have a different ?specific1 meaning
when used in the Uniform Commercial Code.

It is to

be noted however, Section 70A-2-104 uses language of
common understanding in defining "merchant", to~wit,
- fa person who deals in goods of the kind' or Otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction1, or - 'by his employment
of an agent or broker who - by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.1

It

does not seem logical that a person who^ once a year or
perhaps once in two years in the case of dry farmers,
sells the crops he has raised thereby becomes a "person
who deals in goods of the kind" or that he thereby "holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved".

As pointed out by this

court, adoption of plaintiff's argument would make a
"merchant" of practically anyone who sold anything.
Further, if plaintiff's argument applied to sellers,
it would seem that it should also apply to buyers and
the "lawyer or banker" who made annual purchases of
fishing tackle or golf balls would likewise become a

-5-
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"merchant" regardless of the circumstances in each case.
Both the Plaintiff's and Amicus Curiae Briefs miss
the point of this court's ruling that in the instant case
'the trial court should have ruled as a matter of law
under the circumstances shown here the defendant was not
a "merchant" within the meaning of the Statute.'
Despite the Amicus Curiae protest of concern for
Grain Dealers being imposed upon by farmers, they are
protesting in a case where as a matter of fact the Grain
Dealer had, for 12 days while the market rose wildly sat
on his notice of confirmation and then, after the great
rise in price mailed it to the farmer, disregarded the
acknowledged verbal rejection thereof and after the 10
day lapse of time filed his suit claiming damages in excess
of $23,000.00. The condonation of such treatment of farmers
can hardly be in the best interest of AmiCXB Curiae, Grain
Dealers, or the Public. For the same conclusion see Cook
Grains Inc. v. Paul Fallis 395 SW2, 555, 239 Ark. 962.
POINT II.
THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT AN UNEXPLAINED LAPSE OF
12 or 13 DAYS IN RECEIVING A WRITTEN CONFIRMATION OF A
PURPORTED CONTRACT WAS NOT A REASONABLE TIME IN THIS CASE
NOR WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The plaintiff's failure to mail the claimed confirmation
of contract for 12 full days after preparing the same as
he claimed, or the preparation of the alleged confirmation

-6on the 14th day of August, as it would appear from the
location of the confirmation in plaintiff's records,
during which time with plaintiff's full knowledge the
grain market was fluctuating rapidly upward, would seem
to admit to reasonable minds, no other conclusion than
that plaintiff was awaiting a certain favorable position
to himself before forwarding anything that would bind him
to a contract.

To argue that after the sharp rise in price

over a 12 or 13 day period, during which time plaintiff
had made out no less than 6 other notations or confirmations in the same book at increased prices was within a
reasonable time) strains credulity and would be much like
the 'gate keeper' arguing he timely closed the gate afterwatching all the horses run free.

Reference is hereby

made to the Lund vs. St. Paul M&M Railraod Company 71 P.
1032, 31 Wash. 286, Alsam Holding Co. v. Consolidated Tax
Payers Mutual Ins. Co. N.Y.S. 2d 498, State vs. Commissioners
of Cascade County 296 P 1, 89 Montana 37, Citizens Bank
Bldg. v. Ellen E. Werthheimer 180 SW 361, 126 Arkansan 38,.
Hill v. Hobart 16 Main 164, Colefax County vs. Butler
County 120 NW 444 83 Nebraska 803, relating to "reasonable
time" and holding the same to be a question of law.
CONCLUSION
The court properly ruled under the circumstances
of this case that the defendant and appellant was not
by reason of merely having grown and marketed his own

_7-

wheat for a period of 25 years a "merchant", as a
matter of law.

Further the willful or negligent delay

for 12 days on a rapidly fluctuating market, to mail
notice of confirmation of an alleged verbal contract,
under these and the other circumstances of this case
was not done 'within a reasonable time'. The petition
for rehearing should be denied.

Respectfully Submitted,

Omer J. Call
Attorney at Law
26 First Security Bank Bldg.
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
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